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LESSOR LIABILITY IN AIRCRAFT RENTAL
R. BRENT COOPER
In recent years there has been a marked increase in the num-
ber of individuals using private aircraft as a primary or secondary
source of transportation. The fleet of general aviation aircraft now
numbers over 150,000.' Some who possess pilot's licenses have
found the cost of purchasing and maintaining a private aircraft
prohibitive, opening the door to entrepreneurs who perceive a
sizable potential market in the leasing of small general aircraft.
The leasing concept has been very successful with motor vehicles,
and this success seems to be spreading to aircraft leasing.
One problem for lessors of motor vehicles that is also facing the
lessors of private aircraft is legal responsibility for the negligent
acts of the lessee or renter. With increasing numbers of individuals
obtaining licenses, the number of aviation accidents has increased
Beyond the actual accident damage untold time and money is
used to prosecute cases to recover damages or procure settlements.
Since many pilots rent aircraft because they cannot afford the
cost associated with purchase and maintenance, they are in no
position to respond financially to the damage done as a result of
their negligence. For this reason there have been increased efforts
to hold the lessor of the aircraft liable for the negligence of the
lessee-pilot. The attempts by the legislatures and the courts will
be examined along with their positive and negative attributes.
Additionally, new methods of creating the same effect as vicarious
liability will be compared to the statutes imposing vicarious lia-
bility per se.
HISTORY OF VICARIous LIABILITY
The doctrine of vicarious liability originated with master-servant
liability in cases when third parties were trying to hold employers
1 National Transportation Safety Board, Annual Report to Congress, 7 (1974).
"General aviation aircraft" is defined as all nonairline flying aircraft.
I Id. at 41. There were 4,362 general aviation accidents resulting in 1,290
fatalities during 1974.
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liable for the negligent acts of their employees.' The exact ra-
tionale for the creation of the doctrine is the subject of debate.
In ancient law the owner was responsible for the torts of his
servants, wives and slaves.4 One court attributed the creation of
the doctrine to the fact that "by employing him, I set the whole
thing in motion, and what he does, being done for my benefit, and
under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of do-
ing it."5 Others believed the doctrine was based on the fact that
"there ought to be a remedy against some person capable of pay-
ing damages to those injured.' or that if the master were made re-
sponsible for the acts of his servants, he would exercise a greater
degree of care in selecting them.' According to one learned judge,
liability arises from our failure to do our own work. This failure is
permitted by an indulgent law on the condition that we bear
absolute responsibility for those who accomplish our work for us.'
Another supported the principle of natural justice, reasoning that
when one of two innocent persons must suffer through the fraud
of a third, the suffering should be borne by the master who, by
employing the third party, caused the fraud to be committed.
Perhaps, however, the most accurate account is given by Baty.
He stated that "[i]n hard fact, the reason for the employers' lia-
bility is the damages are taken from a deep pocket. '" In the search
for a solvent defendant the courts have turned to the one with the
greatest ability to pay."
The doctrine of vicarious liability has undergone gradual ex-
pansion in the search for solvent defendants. Many jurisdictions
3 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 5 69 (4th ed. 1971). [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]
4Id.
5Duncan v. Finlater, 6 Cl. & F. 894, 910 (1839).
SLimpus v. General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526 (1867).
7 POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS (2d Am. ed. trans. Evans) p. 72.
8ABRIDGEMENT (7th ed. 1832), p. 336.
'Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709).
10 BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY, 154 (1916). For other discussions of vicarious
liability, see James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TULANE L. REv. 161 (1954); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); Wig-
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1894).
" Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97
(1960).
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now hold a master liable for the intentional torts of his servants."
The doctrine of vicarious liability also has been applied to a num-
ber of joint enterprises." Each member of the joint enterprise is
considered an agent and servant of the others and is vicariously
liable for the acts of all."
At common law the general rule was that a bailor was not re-
sponsible for the negligent acts of his bailee." This rule was applic-
able whether the bailment was for hire or was gratuitous." The
courts thought the bailor-bailee relationship was not akin to that
of master-servant and refused to extend the doctrine of vicarious
liability to bailments." Many courts deemed it unjust to hold a
bailor liable for the acts of the bailee over whom the bailor has
no control." This does not mean, however, that a bailor is ab-
12 Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526 (1867); Cohen v.
Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co., 69 N.Y. 170 (1877); Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen,
Mass. 49 (1866); Osipoff v. City of New York, 286 N.Y. 422, 36 N.E.2d 646
(1941).
"Howard v. Zimmerman, 120 Kan. 77, 242 P. 131 (1926); Kokesh v. Price,
136 Minn. 304, 161 N.W. 715 (1917); Connellee v. Nees, 266 S.W. 502 (Tex.
Com. App. 1926).
"'See note 13 supra.
"5Williams v. Younghusband, 57 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1932); Baugh v. Rogers,
24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944); Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams,
217 Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928); Mullally v. Carvill, 356 S.W.2d 238 (Ark.
1962); Smith v. Callahan, 34 De. 129, 144 A. 46 (1928); Engleman v. Traeger,
102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527 (1931); Rockford v. Nolan, 316 Ill. 60, 146 N.E. 564
(1925); Fisher v. Fletcher, 191 Ind. 529, 133 N.E. 834 (1922); Robinson v.
Bruce Rent-A-Ford Co., 205 Iowa 261, 215 N.W. 724 (1927); Halverson v.
Blosser, 101 Kan. 683, 168 P. 863 (1917); Blair v. Boggs, 265 S.W.2d 795 (Ky.
1954); York v. Days, Inc., 153 Me. 441, 140 A.2d 730 (1958); Hartley v. Miller,
165 Mich. 115, 130 N.W. 336 (1911); Fjellman v. Weller, 213 Minn. 457, 7
N.W.2d 521 (1942); McQueen v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 229 Miss. 650, 91
So. 2d 740 (1957); Sweat v. Brozman, 239 Mo. App. 1048, 198 S.W.2d 531
(1947); Mimick v. Beatrice Foods Co., 167 Neb. 470, 93 N.W.2d 627 (1958);
Paul v. Benavidez, 56 N.M. 328, 243 P.2d 1018 (1952); Ford v. McCue, 163 Ohio
St. 498, 127 N.E.2d 209 (1955); Orose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co., 132 Ohio
St. 607, 9 N.E.2d 671 (1955); Kantola v. Lovell Auto Co., 157 Or. 534, 72 P.2d
61 (1937); McColligan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 214 Pa. 229, 63 A. 792 (1906);
Smith v. Domina, 54 R.I. 96, 170 A. 90 (1934); Gathwright v. Carl Markley
'Motor Co., 146 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940, no writ); Young
v. Lamson, 121 Vt. 474, 160 A.2d 873 (1960); Green v. Smith, 146 Va. 442,
131 S.E. 846 (1926); Hammerbeck v. Hubbard, 42 Wash. 2d 204, 254 P.2d 479
(1953); Ritter v. Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 135 S.E. 601 (1926).
" Dean v. Ketter, 328 Ill. App. 206, 65 N.E.2d 572 (1946); McQueen v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding Corp., 229 Miss. 650, 91 So. 2d 740 (1957).
17Siegrist Bakery Co. v. Smith, 162 Tenn. 253, 36 S.W.2d 80 (1931).
15 Id.
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solved from his own negligence. If the bailor knows the bailee to
be incompetent, reckless or otherwise unfit to assume the respon-
sibility created by the bailment, the courts impose liability for
endangering the safety of the general public by entrusting such a
person with the responsibility created by the bailment.' A bailor
was also held to be liable for injuries resulting from defects in the
bailed property." Just as public policy would demand that a
manufacturer refrain from introducing defective products into the
stream of commerce, so also is a bailor required to take care be-
fore granting a bailment.1'
In certain classes of bailments the common law rule denying the
extension of vicarious liability has been superseded by statute."
Most of these statutes concern the renting of motor vehicles and
aircraft. The wide acceptance by the American public of the idea
of leasing as an alternative to purchasing has created a substantial
potential market for those seeking to enter this area. Logically,
the more motor vehicles and aircraft leased, the greater the prob-
ability that more of these will be involved in an accident. The
legislatures of the states have seen a need to expand the remedies
available to the injured party." The courts, however, have expressed
reluctance to expand this liability in the absence of a statute. In
these few instances when the courts sua sponte have imposed
vicarious liability, many have used fiction and superimposed the
relationship of principal and agent over that of bailor and bailee.'
On the other hand, some courts willingly impose vicarious lia-
bility as a matter of public policy." The need for legislative and
judicial intervention is evident, and an increasing number of legisla-
tures and courts have responded to the need."
"Saunders v. Prue, 235 Mo. App. 1245, 151 S.W.2d 478 (1941).
"Alexander v. Check, 241 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21 Id.
2 See discussion infra notes 37-98.
23 Id.
"
t Robinson v. Bruce Rent-A-Ford Co., 205 Iowa 261, 215 N.W. 724 (1927).
'Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
"See discussion infra notes 37-98 and 115-31.
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF AVIATION
I. Common Law
The traditional rule has been that a bailor is not liabile for the
negligent acts of his bailee in the absence of a specific statute."
This is also the generally accepted rule today for bailments of air-
craft. In the absence of a statute providing a remedy, most injured
plaintiffs are precluded from asserting a claim against the bailor
whose bailee's negligence resulted in their injury."
A popular theory employed by the courts during the infancy of
aviation to extend liability to the owners of the aircraft for dam-
ages done by the aircraft was that aviation was an ultrahazardous
activity. The first Restatement of Torts stated in 1938 that:
Aviation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous be-
cause even the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so
incapable of complete control that the flying creates a risk that
the plane even though carefully constructed, maintained and
operated, may crash to the injury of persons, structures and
chattels on the land over which flight is made."
The ultrahazardous activity theory has been abandoned by most
courts"0 because the aviation industry has advanced over the years
to such a stage that, given proper construction, maintenance and
control, the aircraft can be operated with minimal probability of
injury to others. As a result, most courts have tended to view the
operation of aircraft as they would an ordinary activity, such as
driving an automobile, and have fixed the standard of care at that
of a reasonable man."
Florida still clings to the vestiges of the old ultra-hazardous
' See note 15 supra.
21 But see Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974); Note, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 511 (1975).
"9RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938), comment b. The theory of extra-
hazardous activity set forth above was conceived in the decision of Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), when the court applied absolute liability to
the owner of land for water escaping from a man-made lake.
3 0 United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1953); cert. denied,
347 U.S. 934 (1954); D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir.
1950); Margosian v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464, 467 (E.D.N.Y.
1955); Prentiss v. National Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 306, 316 (D.N.J. 1953);
Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97 (1960);
Note, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 511 (1975).
11 See note 30 supra.
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activity theory. The Fifth Circuit in Grain Dealers National Mutual
Fire Insurance Company v. Harrison,"' made an Erie3' prognostica-
tion and held that the Florida courts, if faced with the issue, would
hold that an airplane was a "dangerous agency when in operation
and the owner should be absolutely liable for the acts and omis-
sions of the pilot.""
The future of the doctrine of ultrahazardous activity as a non-
statutory modification of the common law rule denying the appli-
cation of vicarious liability to the lessor-renter situation is un-
certain. But it is quite evident that the prevailing rule in the
absence of a statute is that a plaintiff cannot recover damages from
the owner of an airplane whose bailee's negligence resulted in
injuries to the plaintiff."
II. Statutory Liability
Roughly one-half of the states have some form of statute im-
posing liability on the owner of an aircraft for damages caused by
the renter's operation of the aircraft." The statutes will be ex-
amined and compared in an effort to expose their deficiencies and
to obtain a more favorable solution. These statutes can be classi-
fied into five categories:
A. Statutes providing proof of injury is prima facie evidence of
negligence;
B. 1) Statutes conferring absolute liability for damage to persons
and property on the ground;
2) Statutes conferring absolute liability for damage to persons
'2 Grain Dealers National Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d
726 (5th Cir. 1951). See Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
"The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
held that there was no federal general common law and a federal court sitting
under diversity jurisdiction must apply the common law of the state in which it is
sitting. If, however, the state courts in the state where the federal court is sitting
have not ruled on the issue in question, the federal district court is required to put
itself in the place of the state court where it is sitting and decide the issue as it
believes the state court would have decided it.
- See note 32 supra.
I See discussion, supra notes 15-26.
36Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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and property on the ground, but specifically excluding les-
sors from the coverage of the statute;
C. Statutes conferring absolute liability;
D. Statutes holding the owner-lessor vicariously liable for all negli-
gent acts of the lessee;
E. Definitional Statutes.
A. Statutes Providing Proof of Injury as Prima Facie Evidence of
Negligence
Rather than confer absolute liability on the owner of the air-
craft for damages inflicted by the negligence of the renter, a num-
ber of states merely create a presumption of negligence upon the
showing of injury by the plaintiff." Most specifically mention the
situation in which the aircraft is leased and also provide that if
the aircraft is leased at the time of injury to person or property,
both the owner and lessee shall be prima facie liable and may be
sued jointly or separately."
A close examination of this type of statute will reveal marked
deficiencies. First, the coverage of the statute extends to injuries to
persons or property on land or water.' The guest or passenger in
an aircraft operated by a negligent renter is not entitled to recover.
It appears that the greater potential for injury lies with the air-
craft passenger. (Though the aircraft passenger would seem to be
in more of a position to evaluate the capabilities of the pilot before
embarking on an excursion whereas the plaintiff situated on the
ground would in most instances have no prior contact with the
pilot.) Another limitation of this statute is that absolute liability
is not imposed on the owner."0 After the plaintiff has proved his
injuries proximately resulted from an act of the owner's renter,
both the owner and the renter are prima facie liable.' The owner
and lessee are permitted to rebut the presumption of liability by a
showing that the owner was free from negligence. '
The operation of this type of statute may be summarized in two
3 MD. ANN. CODE, art. 1A, § 3-304 (1957); NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.060
(1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 1-4-3 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 114.05 (1974).
38See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.060(2) (1973).
"I1d. at § 493.060(1).
4 Id.
41 1d. at § 493.060(3).
4 Id.
19761
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statements: 1) the liability is not absolute-there still must be
some negligence on the part of the owner or lessee; and 2) if the
lessee was negligent in the operation of the leased aircraft which
proximately resulted in the plaintiff's injuries, then the lessor-owner
may be vicariously liable.
B. Statutes Conferring Absolute Liability on the Owner of an
Aircraft for Damage to Persons and Property
Other statutes confer absolute liability on the owner of an air-
craft for damages to persons and property. The coverage, however,
is not identical in all of these statutes. In some instances, the lessor
is considered an owner for the purpose of the statute. The statutes
state that if the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to per-
sons or property, both the owner and lessee shall be liable."' The
scope and operation of the statutes under this section are quite
similar to those in Section A. The scope of coverage is limited to
"injuries to persons or property on the land or water."" Like the
scope of those statutes discussed in Section A, passengers and
guests of the lessee-pilot are excluded from coverage of these
statutes.'8 Unlike the statutes in Section A, however, more than a
mere presumption of liability is created. The owner under these
statutes is absolutely liable." The plaintiff need not show any
negligent acts or omissions on the part of the operator, only that
the plaintiff has suffered injuries proximately resulting from the
operation of the aircraft rented by the owner."
Other statutes under this category exclude the lessor-owner from
the operation of the statute'8 by providing that the term "owner"
shall include a person having full title to aircraft and operating it
IN.J. REV. STAT. ANN. S 6:2-7 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 305 (1975);
N.D. CENTURY CODE § 2-03-05 (1975); S.C. CODE § 2-6 (1962); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 224 (1972).
"See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (1973).
45 Id.
46Id.
" Adler's Quality Bakery, Inc. v. Gaseteria, Inc., 32 N.J. 55, 159 A.2d 97
(1960). Here the court stated that one reason for imposing absolute liability on
an owner of an aircraft is that he is the better risk bearer. The court further
found there was a valid legislative purpose and the classification adopted to
achieve such purpose was entirely reasonable and not repugnant to the equal pro-
tection clause of the 14th Amendment.
4"ARK. STAT. S 74-110 (1947); PA. REV. CIV. STAT. tit. 2, § 1469 (Purdon
1963); S. D. COMPILED LAWS § 50-13-6 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-105
(1964).
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through servants, and shall also include a bona fide lessee of such
aircraft, whether gratuitously or for hire, but shall not include a
bona fide bailor or lessor of such aircraft. 9 The case law on this
exclusionary clause is almost nonexistent. Apparently the reason
for excluding lessors from the liability imposed by these statutes
is the extinguishment of control over the aircraft when the lease
is effected. The courts in the past have stated that one should not
be held responsible for the results he cannot control."
C. Statute Conferring Absolute Liability
Currently, only one state has a statute making the owner of an
aircraft absolutely liable for the damages resulting from its opera-
tion." Unlike the statutes discussed in Sections A and B, this statute
includes all injured parties, not just those fortunate enough to be
injured on the ground. The plaintiff need only show that his in-
juries resulted from the actions of the defendant; no showing that
the lessor-owner or lessee-pilot was guilty of a negligent act or
omission is required.
This statute represents broader coverage of all plaintiffs and
defendants than the statutes previously discussed. It does have a
limitation in its application to the lessor-lessee situation. The third
paragraph of the statute states that:
Subdivision one of this section shall not apply where the permis-
sion to use or operate the aircraft is the permission of a lessor,
expressed or implied, in a bona fide lease of the aircraft for a
period of thirty days or more."
Since this limitation would eliminate coverage for aircraft leases
for periods greater than thirty days, potentially a large segment of
the leasing market may be excluded. The plaintiff seeking a direct
route to the deep pockets may suddenly be detoured by the limita-
tion imposed by the statute.
D. Statutes Holding the Owner-Lessor Vicariously Liable for All
Negligent Acts of His Lessee
Perhaps the purest form of vicarious liability is represented by
4 9 See, e.g., PA. REv. Civ. STAT. tit. 2, § 1469 (Purdon 1963).
11 McQueen v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 229 Miss. 650, 91 So. 2d 740 (1957).
S'N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw.§ 251(1) (McKinney 1968).
"Id. at § 251(3). See Byrne v. Sloan, 317 N.Y.S. 719 (App. Div. N.Y. 1971).
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the statutes under section D." For example, the California statute
provides that:
Every owner of an aircraft is liable and responsible for death or
injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful
act or omission in the operation of the aircraft, in the business of
the owner or otherwise, by any person using the same with per-
mission, express or implied, of the owner."
First, the statutes provide that liability is not absolute because
the plaintiff must show a negligent act or omission in the operation
of the aircraft. Secondly, coverage is not limited to injuries to per-
sons or property on the land or water. Under this section a pas-
senger would have a cause of action. Lastly, there is no "out" for
the lessor-owner as provided by some statutes. The coverage ex-
tends to all owners. Of all the statutes discussed these would
appear to offer the broadest coverage and provide the greatest
opportunity for a plaintiff injured by the negligent acts of a lessee
to proceed against the owner of the aircraft.
E. Definitional Statutes
Creative attorneys have repeatedly attempted to impose vicarious
liability on the owners-lessors of aircraft throught the use of defi-
nitional statutes of the federal and various state governments. The
language relied on is found in the Federal Aviation Act" as well
as in many state statutes." Attempts to impose vicarious liability
's CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 5 21404 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1976); MICH.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. S 259.180a (1967).
" CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
m Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 55 1301
et seq. 1970, formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973
[hereinafter referred to as "the Act"]. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26).
51ALA. CODE tit. 4, § 20(25) (1960); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 15-34(20)
(1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 501 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 328.1(14)
(1949); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 15 , § 22.11, 22.42a-22.42o (1963); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 8-21-3-1(h) (Bums 1973); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.011(16)
(1971); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 35(j), 49B-49R (1975); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, 5 3(24) (1964); MICH. COMPILED LAWS § 259.22 (1967); MINN.
STAT. ANN. 5 360,013(10) (1966); Miss. CODE ANN. 5 61-1-3(j) (1973); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 1-1-0(10), as amended, (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. 5
3-101(11) (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 422:3(23) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT.
5 63-1(16) (1975); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 5 251(2) (McKinney 1968); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 2(20) (1972).
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have been brought under both the federal and state statutes."'
The federal statute provides that:
"Operation of aircraft" or "Operate aircraft" means the use of
aircraft, for the purpose of air navigation, and includes the navi-
gation of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the opera-
tion of aircraft, -whether with or without the right of legal control
(in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft,
shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within
the meaning of this chapter."
In the past the use of these statutes resulted in some success.
The current trend, however, appears to be away from construing
the statutes as providing a cause of action."5 Of all the cases find-
ing liability under the definitional statutes, three stand out.
Hoebee v. Howe," the first major case interpreting a definitional
statute to create a cause of action against the owner of a leased air-
plane, concerned a suit by a plaintiff who was thrown from his horse
when it was frightened by a low flying aircraft operated by a lessee
and owned by the defendant. The trial court found the defendant
owner-lessor liable, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
affirmed. In support of its holding the court stated that the legislature
clearly intended to place financial responsibility on the owner of the
conduct of the lessee even though the owner was not in control."'
The court found the language of the statute to be "unequivocal
and without qualification expressed or reasonably to be implied. '"2
The court further relied on House Report No. 2091" which
recommended passage of a bill that would relieve certain security
holders from liability under the act. The court interpreted this
report as an effort by the Congress to define which persons were
not covered by the Act. Since lessors were not excluded, it was
intended that they be included." The owner of the airplane was
"' See notes 60-98 infra and accompanying text.
"O See note 55 supra. The language in the state statutes is substantially the
same.
"°See notes 101-03 inf ra and accompanying text.
6098 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
61 Id. at 225.
62 Id.
3 H. REP. No. 2091, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
0' Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, -, 97 A.2d 223, 226 (1953).
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held to be vicariously liable for his lessee through the use of the
definitional statute.
Hays v. Morgan" was an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained by the plaintiff when he was struck and injured by an
airplane owned by defendants and being used to spray cotton on
a farm where plaintiff was employed." The Mississippi Code con-
tained a provision almost identical to section 1301(26) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958."" The Fifth Circuit held that the
statute was intended to protect the public from negligence and
financial irresponsibility of pilots. The risk of being hit did not
rest with the one on the ground, but on the "owner who author-
izes the use of his airplane. '"'
The court did not refer to the legislative history, but found the
"intent to include owners evident on the face of the statute. '"'
The plaintiff in Lamasters v. Snodgrass"* was a passenger who
was injured because the lessee-pilot was negligent. The plaintiff
brought suit against the owner of the aircraft under an Iowa statute
identical to section 1301(26) of the Federal Aviation Act.." Like
the Hoebee court, the Supreme Court of Iowa supported its hold-
ing in Lamasters with the language of House Report 209-1.7 The
court placed great reliance on the decisions in Hoebee and Hays"'
in concluding that the recent amendment by the legislature dispel-
led any doubts which may have existed originally regarding the
extension of liability to the owner of an airplane for the negligent
acts of his lessee."' The court stated that "the legislature by the
language [of the statute] .. .fixes civil responsibiliy on the owner,
even though he was not in actual control, for the negligent con-
duct of one to whom he entrusted his airplane."'"
1221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
"Id.
6 7 Id. at 482.
"Id.
69 Id.
7085 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1957).
I' id. at 624.
,' Id. Civil Aircraft-Liability of Owner, H. RaP. No. 2091, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948).
"' Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 85 N.W.2d 672, 625 (Iowa 1957).




The construction given to section 1301(26) of the Federal
Aviation Act and identical state statutes by the courts in Hoebee,
Hays, and Lamasters does not appear to represent the current trend
in the judicial construction of these definitional statutes. Most of
the recent decisions attack the reasoning in the Hoebee-Hays-
Lamaster trilogy as faulty."
The first in a group of recent cases holding contra to Hoebee-
Hays-Lamasters was Rosdail v. Western Aviation." Rosdail con-
cerned an action against a lessor of an aircraft for injuries sus-
tained by two passengers and for the death of a third passenger in
a crash of the leased aircraft. 8 Plaintiffs brought suit under the
Federal Aviation Act, basing their cause of action on section
1301(26) of the Act, the same type statute construed in Hoebee-
Hays-Lamasters.
The district court found that section 1301 (26) of the Act did
not establish, either expressly or impliedly, a civil remedy that
would impute a pilot's negligent operation of an aircraft to the
aircraft owner or lessor and did not alter common law principles
to impose such liability." Concerning the creation of a federal
right of action, the court found that traditionally the states have
provided the forums for suits in torts and have determined the
standards of care, defenses to actions in tort, and procedural prob-
lems involved in the prosecution of a suit." In the past the states
have handled this task satisfactorily.81 The court stated that:
Were we to imply a private cause of action from the Federal
Aviation Program, the federal courts would be obliged to fashion
a body of federal tort common law. In the absence of compelling
reasons such as a course is unwise . . . [W]e find no compelling
reason to create a civil remedy for damages from the definitional
section of the Federal Aviation Program, § 1301 (26)."2
The court did not accept plaintiff's proposition that Congress in-
tended to alter tort law principles in section 1301 (26). It found
78 See discussion infra, notes 77-98.
'297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
7i Id. at 681.
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instead that Congress did not intend to alter common law princi-
ples of tort liability with a definitional section designed to regulate
licensing, inspection, and registration of aircraft and airmen be-
cause there was no provision for application to tort liability. In
fact, the section provides that nothing in the program shall abridge
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute."
House Report No. 2091, so extensively relied on by the Hoebee-
Hays-Lamasters courts, was held by the Rosdail court not to sup-
port plaintiff's argument that Congress had intended to alter com-
mon law tort liability because it was clear from the Report that
the purpose of the proposed amendment was to encourage the fi-
nancing of new aircraft by removing the possibility of liability for
damages caused by the aircraft."
The Rosdail court chose not to follow the reasoning in Hoebee,
Hays and Lamasters for several reasons. First, these cases place
significant reliance on House Report No. 2091 as indicating that
Congress intended section 1301(26) apply to common law suits
to impute liability to the bailor and such reliance is unfounded.
Secondly, the federal court in Hays did not have before it the ques-
tion of imputing negligence by means of section 1301(26) and
the two state courts (Hoebee and Lamasters) were likewise inter-
preting state statutes and only spoke in dicta with respect to im-
puting negligence under section 1301(26) of the Federal Aviation
Act. Finally, there is express or implied language in all three cases
that the imputation of negligence by section 1301(26) must be
accompanied by an implication of a civil remedy from the Federal
Aviation Act. 5
A case similar to Rosdail, Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv-
ice," involved a suit for damages for the wrongful deaths of the
passengers of a private plane which was rented to the pilot prior
to the time of the crash." The plaintiffs asserted that by operation
of section 1301(26) of the Federal Aviation Act, the defendant-
lessor became vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. To
support this contention, plaintiffs cited section 1404 of the Federal
82 Id. at 685.
8I Id. See note 63 supra.
8s Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Colo. 1969).
88435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970).
87 d. at 1389.
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Aviation Act88 as evidence that Congress purposefully considered
the question of pre-empting state laws on bailment of airplanes
and- concluded that only those persons exempted by section 1404
should not be held liable as operators. Section 1404 is an enact-
ment of the type of amendment proposed in House Report No.
2091 and relied on in Hoebee-Hays-Lamasters. The Fifth Circuit
did not find such was the intent of Congress, concluding that if
Congress intended pre-emption in this area, it was capable of mak-
ing that intent clear.89
Like the Rosdail court, the Rogers court distinguished Hoebee-
Hays-Lamasters on the grounds that none of these courts specific-
ally dealt with section 1301 (26), but were interpreting nearly
identical state statutes. ° The plaintiff was thus mistaken in relying
on these three cases." The court appeared however, to be less than
forthright in trying to avoid the inconsistency of its prior decision
in Hays. Hays was based on a state statute taken verbatim from
the Federal Aviation Act and the same types of arguments were
used in both cases. In reality, it should make no difference that one
was. a state statute and one was federal. It appears that the court
was trying to correct its earlier decision without overruling Hays.
McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corporation"2 involved a suit against
the owner-lessors of an airplane by passengers injured in a crash
P949 U.S.C. S 1404:
No person having a security interest in, or security title to, any civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a contract of conditional
sale, equipment trust, chattel or corporate mortgage, or other in-
strument of similar nature, and no lessor of any such aircraft,
aircraft engine, or propeller under a bona fide lease of thirty days
or more, shall be liable by reason of such interest or title, or by
reason of his interest as lessor or owner of the aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, or propeller so leased, for any injury to or death of persons,
or damage to or loss of property, on the surface of the earth
(whether on land or water) caused by such aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, or propeller, or by the ascent, descent, or flight of such air-
craft, aircraft engine, or propeller, or by the dropping or falling of
an object therefrom, unless such aircraft, aircraft engine, or pro-
peller is in the actual possession or control of such person at the'
time of such injury, death, damage, or loss.
89 Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir.
1970).
" See notes 54 and 66 supra.
" Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.
1970).
-450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
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allegedly caused by the negligence of the pilot. Like the plaintiffs
in Rosdail and Rogers, the plaintiff here argued that by virtue of
section 1301(26) the negligence of the pilot should be imputed
to the owners-lessors as a matter of law.' The McCord court re-
jected the rationale of Hoebee" and further found, relying on
Rogers, that no merit existed in plaintiff's argument that Congress,
by failing to exempt specifically owners and lessors in section 1404
of the Act, intended that they be absolutely liable for injuries sus-
tained by passengers of leased aircraft."
The plaintiffs in McCord also made a public policy argument
based on the "deep pockets" theory, contending if the court did
not imply a civil remedy under section 1301(26) of the Act, the
victim might go remediless."' They asserted that the owner, rather
than the pilot, would in most cases have the "deeper pocket" and
"as a matter of public policy, it would be convenient, logical and
consistently evenhanded to impute negligence to the fixed base
operator."97 The Tenth Circuit, however, found that the purpose of
the Act was to regulate licensing, inspection and registration of
aircraft and pilots. Absent a showing of compelling federal inter-
est, the court concluded that to imply such a remedy would con-
stitute judicial law making."
A summary of the statutes discussed above clearly indicates
deficiencies in their scope and/or operation. While those statutes
discussed under Section A have a broad reach and include all les-
sors as defendants, they have an inherent weakness in the coverage
of plaintiffs. Only persons or property located on the surface of
land or water at the time of the accident may be compensated.
Those unfortunate enough to be passengers in the ill-fated aircraft
would be unable to proceed against the owner-lessor.
The deficiency in scope of coverage of plaintiffs under Section
A statutes likewise pervades those statutes under Section B. Under
Section B, however, the operation of the statutes creates absolute
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* Assuming of course that section 1301(26) or a corresponding state statute
does create vicarious liability on the part of the lessor-owner as held by the courts
in Hayes, Hoebee, and Lamasters.
presumption as in the statutes under Section A. Those statutes
under Section B(2) do not include lessors as owners.
The statute under Section C is probably the most favorable to
the plaintiffs. Anyone injured may recover under this statute be-
cause it imposes absolute liability on the lessor. The scope of de-
fendants included is somewhat restricted, however, by the require-
ment that the term of the lease be less than thirty days.
The only weakness evident on the face of Section D statutes is
the requirement of a showing of negligence. In many cases where
there are no eyewitnesses, this showing may be a formidable task
although modem technology employed in accident investigation"
as well as the acceptance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by
many courts have eased this burden somewhat.1"
99 Sales, Discovery Problems in Aviation Litigation, 38 J. Ant L. & COM. 297
(1972).
1WComment, Res lpsa Loquitur In Small Aircraft Litigation, 41 J. Am L. &
COM. 103 (1975).
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Perhaps the most tenuous of all the statutes discussed are those
definitional statutes under Section E. While they have been accept-
ed by some courts interpreting them as state statutes, °' attempts
by plaintiffs to impose liability under the federal statute havelbeen
rejected almost universally," and the current trend seems to reject
their application as state statutes also," Most of the decisions find-
ing liability under these statutes came in the 1950's while those re-
jecting such an extension of vicarious liability are fairly recent.
Additionally, the grounds upon which the earlier decisions were
founded have been rejected in later decisions as erroneous. ,n light
of these facts, future successful imposition of vicarious liability
through the definitional statutes appears questionable.
The critical weakness characteristic of each of these statutes is
the problem of solvency. No matter how much liability the statutes
may create, if the defendant is uninsured and insolvent, the plain-
tiff will go remediless. While these statutes have gone far in at-
tempting to bring a solvent defendant into the picture, they only
go half of the way. Additional measures are needed to insure that
the owner-lessor is solvent.
The .Fifth Circuit in Hays looked to the motor vehicle statutes
in fashioning its remedy.' The enterprise of motor vehicle leasing
had earlier success than aircraft leasing, and, consequently, more
legislation has been passed to regulate this activity. This, field




The development of lessor liability in motor vehicle leasing
has followed a similar course to that of aircraft leasing. The
. 
gen-
eral rule is that in the absence of a statute imposing liability, the
owner of a motor vehicle is not liable to strangers for injuries oc-
101 See discussion infra, notes 59-75.
"I See discussion supra, notes 76-97. Cf. Sosa v. Young Flying Service, 277
F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
103Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961); Ferrari
v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 I11. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558 (1971).
104Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1955).
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curring from the negligent use of the automobile by one to whom
it has been lent or hired. 10
The common law rule has been modified in a number of states
by statute or judicial decision."0 Some states have enacted statutes
similar to those discussed earlier in the aviation area. Most provide
that a lessor of a motor vehicle shall be jointly and severally liable
with the lessee for the damages caused by the negligence of the
lessee."7 Florida has imposed vicarious liability on the lessors of
'° Cruse-Crawford Mfg. Co. v. Rucker, 220 Ala. 101, 123 So. 897 (1929);
Schneider v. McAleer, 39 Ariz. 190, 4 P.2d 903 (1931); White v. Sims, 211
Ark. 499, 201 S.W.2d 21 (1947); Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183
(1937); Sawyer v. Blanchard, 126 Colo. 485, 251 P.2d 434 (1952); Nash v.
Holzbeierlein & Sons, 68 A.2d 403 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949); Engleman v. Traeger,
102 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527 (1931); Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S.E. 338
(1907); White v. Seitz, 342 111. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1931); Hunter v. Irwin, 220
Iowa 693, 263 N.W. 34 (1935); Halverson v. Blosser, 101 Kan. 683, 168 P.
863 (1917); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 258 S.W.2d
5 (Ky. 1953); Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 239 La. 616, 119 So. 2d 484 (1959);
Phillips v. Gookin, 231 Mass. 250, 120 N.E. 691 (1918); Martin v. Schiska, 183
Minn. 256, 236 N.W. 312 (1931); Bourgeois v. Mississippi School Supply Co.,
170 Miss. 310, 155 So. 209 (1934); Reis v. Gentry, 87 S.W.2d 1037 (Mo. 1935);
Snyder v. Russell, 140 Neb. 616, 1 N.W.2d 125 (1941); Wilkins v. Page, 91
N.H. 409, 20 A.2d 647 (1941); Ruchlin v. A. G. Motor Sales Corp., 127 N.J.L.
378, 22 A.2d 767 (1941); Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185
(1936); Tyson v. Frutchey, 194 N.C. 750, 140 S.E. 718 (1927); Posey v. Krogh,
65 N.D. 490, 259 N.W. 757 (1935); Osber v. Yeggerman, 38 Ohio App. 498,
176 N.E. 123 (1930); Randolph v. Schuth, 185 Okl. 204, 90 P.2d 880 (1939);
Kantola v. Lovell Auto Co., 157 Ore. 534, 72 P.2d 61 (1937); Gemma v. Ro-
tondo, 62 R.I. 293, 5 A.2d 297 (1939); East Tennessee & Western North Carolina
Motor Transp. Co. v. Brooks, 173 Tenn. 542, 121 S.W.2d 559 (1938); Ortiz v.
Echols, 131 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, writ dism'd jud.
cor.); Green's Ex'rs v. Smith, 146 Va. 442, 131 S.E. 846 (1926); Canonzeri v.
Heckert, 223 Wis. 25, 269 N.W. 716 (1936).
1"6CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. 5 14-154a (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
1862 (1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.305 (1975); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
388 (McKinney 1970).
107 See note 106 supra. Various reasons have been cited for the modification of
the rule. Some are:
Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Col. 1932). Here the
court stated that:
We do not think that the legislature acted unreasonably in imposing
upon driverless car owners alone the requirements found in the
challenged provisions of the act. Such provisions were enacted in
the exercise of the police power in an effort to secure safety for
person and property by regulating the use of the public streets and
highways. The Legislature may well have believed that one who-
has no pecuniary interest in the automobile he drives has less in-
ducement to drive carefully upon the public thoroughfares, and is
more likely to become a menace to person and property than one
who has such a pecuniary interest.
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motor vehicles through the use of the outdated "dangerous instru-
mentality" doctrine."8 This doctrine rests on the theory that since
an owner is required to license his automobile, an operator in law-
ful possession with the owner's consent in effect operates it under
the authority of the license of the owner and for the benefit of the
owner. The operator is by fiction made the agent of the owner.
This fictional theory has been rejected by a sizable majority of the
states.
The same gap, however, exists here that existed under the avia-
tion statutes. An act may bring in additional defendants to "deepen
the pocket," but if the additional defendants are insolvent, the re-
sult is the same as if there were no statute. Some states have
bridged this "solvency gap" through the promulgation of special
statutes requiring the lessor to provide insurance for the renter
against liability arising out of the renter's negligence before the
cars can be registered and used for leasing or the owner-lessor be
given a license to operate the enterprise.'" Other states have ac-
complished substantially the same result through the use of general
motor vehicle financial laws.' Nearly every state and also the Dis-
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Rental Co., Inc., 143 A. 163, 164 (Conn.
1928):
The purpose of the statute was not primarily to give the injured
person a right of recovery against the tortious operator of the car,
but to protect the safety of the traffic upon highways by provid-
ing an incentive to him who rented motor vehicles to rent them to
competent and careful operators by making him liable for damages
resulting from the tortious operation of the rented vehicles.
See also Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 370 Ky. 470, 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (1949).
Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 123 Ohio St. 284,
175 N.E. 196, 199 (1931).
Concededly, the automobiles are rented on a mileage basis and for
operation over the public streets; so that for every mile of travel
for which a rental fee is exacted of the lessee a mile of public
street has been used in earning such rental fee, and, while the use
of the public streets by the lessee has been a use of such streets by
a member of the public in the ordinary way, such use by the lessor
has been a use for his own gain, just as the use of the streets by
street cars, buses and taxicabs is a use by them for their own gain.
101 Hertz Corp. v. Hellens, 140 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1962).
'09CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. S 14-15 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, S 6102
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-621 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.655
(1971); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, 5 32E (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-281
(1975); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 8-101 (1962); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-34-1
(1956); S. D. COMPILED LAWS § 58-23-4 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. S 46.1-14
(1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 344.51 (1971).
110 ALA. CODE tit. 36, §§ 74(42)-74(83) (1958); ALAS. STAT. 5§ 28-20.010-
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trict of Columbia have adopted some form of financial responsi-
bility law.'" The scope of these statutes is broad enough, in the
absence of a more specific statute, to cover motor vehicle leasing.
Most of these statutes define "owner" to include the lessor, sub-
jecting him therefore to the operation of the statute."' One differ-
ence exists in the operation of the general financial responsibility
statutes and those specifically applicable to lessors. Whereas the
specific statutes require a showing of proof of liability insurance
prior to registration and licensing of the vehicles, the general stat-
utes do not require a showing of financial responsiblity or proof
of liability insurance until after the accident. ' Should a person
be required to furnish proof of financial responsibility and be un-
able, or neglect or refuse to furnish security, his drivers license
and the license of every motor vehicle owned by him may be sus-
28-20.640 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. 55 28-1101-28-1225 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 75-1401-75-1492 (1947); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16000-16503 (Deering
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-7-101 et seq. (1973); CONN. REV. GEN.
STAT. § 14-111-14-144 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 2901-2972 (1974);
D.C. CODE ANN. SS 40-417-40-498c (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 324.011-324.251
(1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601-92A-621 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
287-1-287-48 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 49-1501-49-1540 (1947); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 951, S§ 7-101 -7-502 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. S§ 9-2-1-1 -9-2-1-45
(1971); IOWA CODE §§ 321A.1-321A.39 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101-
40-3121 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 187.290-187.990 (1950); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 32:851-32:1043 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29, §§ 781-88 (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 661, § 7-101 -7-635 (1957); MICH. CoMp. LAws §§ 257.501 -257.532
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.21-170.58 (1960); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
64-15-1-64-15-75 (1972); MONT. REV. STAT. §§ 53-418-53-458 (1947); Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 303.010-303.370 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-501 -60-569
(1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 268:1-268:27 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
485.010-485.420 (1957); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-23-39:6-104 (1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-42 - 64-24-107 (1953); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §5
330-368 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1-20-279.39 (1975);
N.D. CENTURY CODE §S 39-16-01 - 39-16-37 (1972); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§
4509.1 -4509.99 (1973); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §5 7-101 -7-505 (1962); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 486.011-486.991 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 1401- 1436
Purdon's 1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 31-31-1 -31-34-6 (1956); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-701-46-750.28 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS §§ 32-35-1-32-35-112
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. 55 59-1201-59-1240 (1968); TEX. REV. Ciy. STAT.
ANN. art. 6701h (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-12-1-41-12-41 (1953); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-388-46.1-514 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 801-921
(1967); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.29.010-46.29.625 (1970); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 17D-4-1-17D-4-20 (1974); Wis. STAT. §§ 344.01-344.52 (1971); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §5 31-277-31-315.4 (1957).
. See note 110 supra.
"l See, e.g., Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 506 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1975).
"' See generally, note 110.
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pended."' Though perhaps not incentive for the average driver, the
threat of suspension of the license of every motor vehicle owned
by a lessor should in reality make liability insurance or some form
of indemnity protection compulsory to the prudent businessman
engaged in motor vehicle leasing.
These statutes do not purport to create vicarious liability in
which payment is automatic without regard to negligence. They
only increase the probability that if the persons covered by the
statute cause damage and are found to be liable, the plaintiff will
be compensated. These statutes have the effect, however, of creating
vicarious liability because they force the lessor-owner to insure
against the negligent acts of the lessee-renter. The result to the
plaintiff is the same. Instead of the lessor insuring himself for the
negligent acts of the renter for fear that he will be held liable under
a vicarious liability statute, he is now insuring the lessee for his
own conduct and negligent acts. In either instance the net effect
is to guarantee the plaintiff a fund to recover, if the defendant is
found liable. Under many vicarious liability statutes the plaintiff
proves negligence on the part of the renter, then by statute imputes
that negligence to the lessor so that he may recover from the lessor.
Under the financial responsibility laws, the plaintiff proves negli-
gence on the part of the renter and recovers from a fund provided
by the lessor. Either way, the result is substantially the same. As-
suming the propriety of the "deep pockets" theory, it would seem
more logical to discard the fictions associated with the vicarious
liability statutes (the owner-lessor is not negligent but the renter
is) and to have a tort compensation system which is an embodi-
ment of the "deep pockets" theory. When the owner-lessor is not
negligent, but there is an injured plaintiff in need of compensation,
the law places this burden on the owner-lessor since he is in the
best position to provide compensation.
A number of aircraft financial responsibility acts have been pro-
mulgated by various states.1" Most of these statutes are patterned
after the Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act. These
114 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. 9-2-1-4 (1971).
"'CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 5 15-102-15-120 (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
15J, §§ 22.42a-22.42o (1971); MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 90, SS 49B-49R
(1975); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 259.671- 259.692 (1948); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 422-A:1 -422-A:23 (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 8-21-3-1 -8-21-3-23 (1971).
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acts are not directed at lessors specifically as were some of the stat-
utes in the preceding section, ' yet their scope is broad enough to
encompass the lessor."" Their operation is similar to the general
motor vehicle financial responsibility acts. For example, the statute
adopted by Connecticut provides that within thirty days after the
receipt of an accident report, the commissioner of transportation
will enter an order setting the amount of security he deems neces-
sary to satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from the acci-
dent."' The owner and operator of the aircraft have thirty days to
deposit the specified amount of security with the commissioner."'
Upon failure to provide the requisite security, the commissioner
then shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner-and of
all his aircraft-and the operating privilege of the operator."' A
deposit is not required if the owner had insured the aircraft in-
volved in the accident and the policy was in effect at the time of
th accident.'
These statutes have the effect of requiring compulsory liability
insurance or some other form of indemnity protection on the part
of aircraft lessors. If the lessor is unable to furnish the security re-
quired by the commissioner's order, he risks losing his license to
operate the specific aircraft involved in the accident as well as the
operating privilege of all aircraft owned by him. Such threat
should furnish incentive to require the prudent businessman to pur-
chase liability insurance to avoid the requirements as to security
and the threat of suspension.'
With the exception of Indiana none of the states exempt pas-
sengers of the aircraft from coverage.' " The coverage of persons
and property is at a maximum, with only damage to "property
owned by the owner or operator or in his care, custody or control
or carried in or on the aircraft", " excluded.
" See note 109 supra.
1'See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. R v. § 15-102(d) (1975); Allegheny Airlines,
Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 114 (7th Cir. 1974).
... CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 15-105(a)(i).
119 Id. at § 15-105(b).
120 Id.




ND. ANN. STAT. § 8-21-3-4 (1971).
.. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. S 15-104(a) (1975).
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Two states have chosen not to adopt the Uniform Aircraft Re-
sponsibility Act and have instead promulgated statutes of their
own to cover leasing. Virginia has adopted a statute requiring
proof of financial responsibility prior to the licensing of the aircraft
rather than after the accident, as required by the Uniform Aircraft
Financial Responsibility Act.' " This statute applies to all aircraft
involved in general aviation, not just those used for leasing.
Maryland has promulgated a financial responsibility statute spe-
cifically for rental aircraft.' This statute provides that:
No person shall rent or lease any aircraft to a renter-pilot unless
there is a policy of insurance in force on the aircraft covering
claims by passengers or other persons for injuries to them or
damage to their property arising out of the aircraft. (commonly
called liability insurance)..
Proof of insurance is required annually at the time of the registra-
tion of the aircraft.' "
The Maryland statute represents the optimum solution to finan-
cial responsibility in aircraft leasing and rental. First, the legisla-
ture has recognized that aircraft leasing has problems unique from
general aviation just as many states have treated motor vehicle
rental separately from general traffic."' The broad scope of the
statute specifically permits recovery by passengers, as well as per-
sons on the surface of land or in water, in its operation.1" Proof of
insurance is required prior to registration rather than after the
accident as in the Uniform Financial Responsibility Act. The rela-
tively high limits of coverage mean the minimum amount of in-
surance required by the lessor is sufficient to provide adequate
compensation to an injured plaintiff.""1
The financial responsibility laws have the same effect as those
applicable to motor vehicles. By requiring that the lessor in-
" VA. CODE ANN. 5 5.1-88.1 (1950).
' MD. ANN. CODE art. IA § 3-305 (1957).
127 Id. at 5 3-305(a).
128 Id. at 5 3-305(c).
129 See note 106 supra.
3
'MD. ANN. CODE art. IA S 3-305(a) (1957).
1 Id. at § 3-305(b).
The "liability insurance" shall be in the amount of not less than$50,000 bodily injury per person, $100,000 per accident, and $50,000
physical damage protection.
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sure against the renter's negligence, the same effect is reached as
if a vicarious liability statute were in operation. As previously dis-
cussed, these financial responsbility laws do not purport to impose
per se vicarious liability. But, by requiring that the lessor insure
the renter against his own negligence, the same result is reached
as if the plaintiff made out his case of negligence against the renter,
by statute had imputed the negligence to the lessor, and then col-
lected from the lessor.
CONCLUSION
Two basic approaches have been used by the states to impose
the effects of vicarious liability on those renting aircraft. The first
method is a "direct" approach. The legislatures have promulgated
statutes making a lessor jointly and severally liable with his lessee
for the damage inflicted by the negligent acts of the lessee. The
second method is a "indirect" approach, requiring the lessor to
insure or obtain some form of indemnity or insurance for any dam-
age inflicted by the operation of the aircraft leased by him.
Those "direct" statutes are inherently flawed because many limit
the scope of persons who may recover by specifically excluding
passengers. Moreover, even if the plaintiff and defendant are with-
in the scope of the statute, and the plaintiff shows negligence on
the part of the defendant (assuming a showing of negligence is re-
quired), the plaintiff may go remediless if the defendant is insolv-
ent and not covered by liability insurance. Creation of vicarious
liability by statute will be of no use to an injured plaintiff unless
he can actually recover.
On the other hand, the "indirect" or financial responsibility ap-
proach bridges the gaps left by the statutes imposing vicarious li-
ability because lessors are included in all statutes and passengers
are entitled to recover in every state except Indiana. Once in op-
eration these statutes have a vicarious liability effect. Moreover,
the solvency gap existing in the vicarious liability statutes has been
alleviated to a large extent.
With the ever increasing popularity of general aviation, the de-
mand for rental aircraft is likely to increase. This increase will pro-
vide added incentive to establish a more predictable scheme of
obtaining compensation for plaintiffs who are injured by careless
1976]
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and incompetent renters. Vicarious liability now appears to be a
fact of life. The Maryland statute represents the better solution to
the problem of compensating the injured plaintiff than any of the
other vicarious liability statutes or other financial responsibility
acts. Its coverage is broad, a characteristic lacking in most vicari-
ous liability statutes. It requires proof of financial responsibility
prior to registration of the aircraft rather than after the accident,
a weakness in the Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act.
The fund from which recovery is to be made is assured in nearly
every case. These factors would indeed make Maryland the leader
in the search for newer and better means of adequately compensat-
ing persons injured by the reckless operation of aircraft by lessees.
